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MOTIVATED DOGMATISM AND 
THE HIGH-ABILITY STUDENT 
Jennifer Riedl Cross and Tracy L. Cross 
THE COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY 
I suppose it is tempting, if the only tool you have is a hammer, to treat every-
thing as if it were a nail. 
Maslow (1966, p. 15) 
The dogmatic individual is, in many ways, a loss to humanity. Our unique abil-
ity to develop hypotheses about the world we live in and, then, to test their 
veracity has brought us to this astounding information age. Thinking about 
our problems with an ever-widening perspective, from individual to societal to 
global, has allowed us to improve the life conditions of nearly everyone on the 
planet, albeit some more than others. There is more information available to the 
average individual today than ever before in the history of humankind. When 
an individual chooses to ignore relevant available information to maintain a posi-
tion, the unique ability we humans share-to think about a problem-is wasted . 
From a psychological perspective, the decision to ignore information is not 
arbitrary. A person placing a priority onmaintaining a position over considering 
relevant information does so for a reason. Perhaps the information, although 
available, is imperceptible to the individual. The message stated loud and clear 
to a person with impaired hearing simply will not be heard. The message stated 
clearly at a graduate-student vocabulary level may well be unintelligible to a 
child. Relevant information i lost. But the hearing impaired or the child in 
these examples is not considered dogmatic. The dogmatic individual can hear 
or understand the message, but chooses not to listen to or process it. Dog-
matism is a behavior, and a behavior that is not reflexive is motiva ted. These 
motivations deserve scrutiny. Although one might imagine high intellectual 
ability to provide superior belief system.s, there is no evidence for such a <level-
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opmental anomaly. There i in fact, evidence to the contrary (e.g., Klaczyn ki, 
1997; Klaczynski, Gordon, & Fauth, 1997; Stanovich & West, 1997) that will 
be discus ed here. 
Highly able individual develop in a complex world made up of widely dis­
parate influences and experience (Bronfenbrenner, 1979; Colem.an & Cros , 
2005). A they n1.ature, they are expo ed to parents who may or may not be 
caring and re pon ive to their need (Baumrind, 1971). They may grow up 
in dangerou environments or with chooling inadequate not only for their 
giftednes , but to meet any child' need . Erik on (1968) describe the crises 
that face all individual as they develop and gifted children experience all of 
the e cri e . The combination and permutation of all factor po sible to affect 
the lives of the developing child are eemingly infinite. A they create their 
worldview and belief sy tern , whatever factor have been influential will have 
different con equences. 
Con idering the lack of a common definition of giftedne , individuals who 
bear the label will have a wide variety of exceptional abilitie , but all fall under 
the umbrella definition of "hum.an ' and all are subject to the need identified 
by Abraham Maslow (1970) for drive satisfaction. Only when the phy iological 
need of hunger and thir t are atisfied can a per on begin to concern herself 
with afety needs " ecurity; structure, order, law and limit ; trength in the 
protector; and so on" (p. 18). Meeting the e afety needs is a precondition 
for pursuing sati faction of the need for belongingne and love, and then of 
e teem. (of elf and from other ). Integral to attaining the ba ic need at all lev­
el i another hierarchy of n ed , which Ma low describe as interr lated and 
ynergi tic with the fir t. The e are the cognitive need , in which the "de ire to 
know i prepotent over the de ire to under tand ' (p. 50). A dogmati t may have 
atisfied her or his desire to know and under tand long before a per on with a 
more open mind. Any discu sion of dogmati m m.u t con ider the motivation 
behind an individual' choice to inadequately proces available information, 
particularly when that individual po e e exceptional intellectual ability. 
Psychological re earch over the pa t everal decade provides us with a num­
ber of per pectives on the phenomenon of dogmati m, the tendency of an indi­
vidual to ignore evidence while holding firm.ly to a belief that may or may 
not be warranted. Dogmatism is a failure to engage in thinking, a premature 
" ettling" on a belief. In thi chapter, we discu several associated avenues of 
research that apply to an inability or motivation leading to uch a failure. The 
discu ion i followed by suggestions for developing open mind among high­
ability tudent . 
What Dogmatism Is and Is Not 
A we delve into an analy is of dogmati m., it i important to m.aintain per pec­
tive on ju t what we mean by the word. Dogmati m i a way of approaching 
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information, a means of forming a belief and an attitude. An attitude differs from 
a belief. An attitude is a judgment one has made, whereas a belief is information 
one has. A belief may be factual or not, but it does not include a value judgment 
about the item. An attitude is such a value judgment, a "general positive or 
negative feeling toward something" (Petty & Cacioppo, 1981, p. 7). Values are 
"concepts or beliefs ... about desirable end states or behaviors ... [that] transcend 
specific situations ... [ and] guide selection or evaluation of behaviors and events" 
(Bilsky & Schwartz, 1994, p. 164). Values lay the foundation for the formation 
of attitudes and beliefs by directing an individual's attention toward information 
that serves a motivational need. Schwartz and colleagues (Bilsky & Schwartz, 
1994; Schwartz, 1994; Schwartz, Sagiv, & Boehnke, 2000) describe these values 
as existing on opposing continua situated along two dimensions: self-enhance-
n1ent versus self-transcendence and openness to change versus conservatism. 
We can see an example of these value structures in Lakoff's (1996) analysis 
of different political perspectives. He describes the opposing conservative and 
liberal value orientations that are emblematic of differing points on Schwartz's 
dimensions. Lakoff's Strict Father values strength above all else. This self-
enhancement ideal is best served by conservative values. Being open to change 
would permit challenges to one's power. The Nurturant Parent, who exists on 
the opposite end of both dimensions , is self-transcendent and open to change. 
These ideals are best served through empathy for others and an acceptance of 
differing views. The value of strength that is the focus of the Strict Father has 
been an important one in human history. Real dangers exist in nature and 
among societies, particularly those that are fearful for their power or safety. The 
Nurturant Parent, on the other hand, values strength, but only in the protec-
tion and nurturance of others. Both value orientations have had a prominent 
history in a world of two genders. 
Individuals with a conservative value orientation are likely to be more dog-
matic than those open to change, because an evaluation of relevant informa-
tion will present challenges to one's belief system. Conservatism-of any type 
and not necessarily of a political sort-holds to its beliefs and is motivated by a 
desire for predictability and security. A conservative may be evaluating infor-
mation very carefully as it relates to those motivations, however. In examining 
information that would maintain a predictable and secure world, the conserva-
tive may make different assumptions than a liberal who looks at the same infor-
mation as it relates to self-transcendence. These different assumptions were 
arrived at with deliberation of facts through different lenses. A dogmatist would 
not consider the facts. 
Simply because a person cannot be swayed to our point of view does not 
make her or him dogmatic. Dogmatism is defined as "1) positiveness in asser-
tion of opinion especially when unwarranted or arrogant[and] 2) a viewpoint 
or system of ideas based on insufficiently examined premises" (Merriam-Webster 
Online Dictionary, 2010). It is the notions of "unwarranted assertions" and 
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"insufficiently examined premises" that we can explore through the psycho-
logical lens. If belief has been obtained through a careful consideration of evi-
dence, dogmatism is not a valid criticism. Value orientations play an important 
role in the development of belief, but differing values do not necessarily arise 
from an insufficient evaluation of evidence. 
Thinking Dispositions 
Stanovich (2001) describes thinking dispositions as different from cogn1t1ve 
ability. He cites Baron (1988) in n1aking the argun1ent that the emphasis on 
ability in our conceptions of intelligence has distorted our perception of the 
role dispositions play in individual ' thinking. Kuhn (personal communication, 
April 3, 2010) suggests that the various thinking dispositions are affective, in 
contrast to the actual processing of information, which is cognitive . Our pro-
cessing of information is not limited by our abilities alone. We each have differ-
ent "goals and epistemic values" (Stanovich, 2001, p. 247) that bring different 
capacities to bear on any decision making in which we engage. Research on 
cognition over the past several decades ha exposed ome of these dispositions. 
They have received little attention in the research on gifted students, but are 
highly applicable to a study of dogmatism among the highly able . What follows 
is a description of a few of the most relevant of these dispositions. 
Tolerance of Ambiguity Through her re earch in authoritarianism, Frenkel-
Brunswik (1949) identified an intolerance of anibiguity, a general personality 
variable found to be associated with dogmatism. Budner (1962) expanded 
on her work, describing intolerance of ambiguity as "a tendency to evaluate 
particular phenomena in a particular way ... a tendency to manifest certain 
modes of response irrespective of the phenomena being dealt with" (p. 31). 
In other words, intolerance of ambiguity-"the tendency to perceive (i.e., 
interpret) ambiguous situations as sources of threat"-motivates certain 
responses to stin1uli. Ambiguous situations lack the cues necessary to be 
structured or categorized by the individual; they are novel, complex, or 
insoluble. The intolerance of ambiguity scale developed by Budner is correlated 
with authoritarianism, conventionalisn1, dogmatism about religious beliefs, and 
other attitudes or characteristics consistent with an extreme belief system (e .g. , 
Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). 
Regardless of ability level, some individuals will prefer more or less ambigu-
ou situations because of the threat they feel from the difficulty in comprehend-
ing them. If an individual studiously avoids a situation or opposes a position 
because of its ambiguity, any decisions made will have been achieved through 
an insufficient examination of premises. We have found no indications from 
empirical research that high-ability students have a greater tolerance of ambi-
guity than their less able peers. 
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Closed-Mindedness Rokeach 's (1960) conception of closed- and open-
mindedness is perhaps most closely aligned with a description of a dogmatic 
or non-dogmatic thinker. The construct of closed-mindedness was developed 
from his assertion that it is the structure of a belief system that leads one to 
"accept or reject idea , people, and authority" (p. 8). In Rokeach's definition of 
an open mind, information i evaluated and acted on without influence from 
irrelevant internal (i .e. , habits , perceptual cues, power needs, etc.) or external 
(i .e., authority figures, cultural norms, etc.) pre sures. A closed mind, on the 
other hand, is less aware of the relevance of internal and external influence. 
"The more closed the system, the more i the acceptance of a particular belief 
a sumed to depend on irrelevant internal drives and/ or arbitrary reinforcements 
from external authority" (p . 61). Individuals who score high on Rokeach's 
Dogmatism Scale differ in their "ability to form new belief sy terns" (p. 397) 
from those who core low. Rokeach believed that there are dual motivations 
behind a closed or open mind: "the need for a cognitive framework to know 
and to understand and the need to ward off threatening a pect of reality" (p. 
67). He saw a closed mind as protection against anxiety. A do ed mind serve 
as "a cognitive system .. . designed to shield a vulnerable mind" (p. 70). The 
certainty of the do ed n1ind i protective again t the doubt presented by the 
outside world. 
In more recent re earch, Stanovich and West (1997) developed a measure of 
actively open-minded thinking. This in trument indicate openness to belief 
change and cognitive flexibility. Stanovich and West explore the construct in 
their research on critical thinking; proposing, and ub equently finding, that 
one cannot think critically without a willingness or ability to challenge his or 
her prior beliefs. 
Certainty Orientation According to Sorrentino and Short (1986), all 
individuals have a predisposition toward achieving certainty or avoiding it. An 
uncertainty-oriented individual does not avoid information gathering, he or she 
avoids reaching a definite or certain conclusion. The certainty-oriented person, 
on the other hand, will not attempt to find more information if it will challenge 
her present knowledge; " ... uncertainty-oriented people attend to ituations 
that attain clarity, whereas certainty-oriented people attend to situations that 
maintain clarity" (p. 391) . Such statements as " I know what I believe and 
I believe what I believe is right" (G. W. Bush; Sanger, 2001, in Jo t et al., 
2003, p. 353) can be interpreted as representing a certainty orientation. This 
orientation will affect both one' right-left belie£ and their ideological rigidity. 
The certainty-oriented person is likely to choo e the opinion that provide the 
mo t certainty. Sorrentino and Short describe the certainty-oriented person 
thi way: 
Self-assessment, ocial (and physical) comparison, di onance reduction, 
cau al searches and attributions, po sible selves, self-concept di crepancy 
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reduction, self-confrontation, social justice, and equity are all character-
istics that this person does not have or is not susceptible to. This person is 
likely to be prejudiced, bigoted, opinionated, and a sexist. 
(p. 400) 
The opposite-open-minded, tolerant of differences, flexible-is rn.uch 
more ambiguous and challenging to process intellectually. The uncertainty-
oriented person is identified by these characteristics. Through their open-
n1indedness and acceptance of a1nbiguity, a more complex understanding of 
the world is possible. 
Need for Cognitive Closure In his theory of lay epistemics, Kruglanski (1989) 
proposes that there are individual differences in the Need for Cognitive Closure, 
the need to achieve an answer-any answer-to avoid confusion or ambiguity. 
Situations vary as well, and some situations are more favorable when closure is 
avoided, as in making an important decision that will mean sacrifice or hard hip. 
Although need for closure can be affected by such situational differences as 
time pressure, ambient noise, or attractiveness of the task, there is a general 
tendency for individuals to attempt to achieve closure with similar patterns that 
vary individually (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). It is difficult to maintain an 
open mind when one seeks closure rapidly. This construct is an elaboration 
of Rokeach 's (1960) closed-mindedness and includes aspects of Sorrentino and 
Short's (1986) certainty orientation. There are times when one n1ust achieve 
closure quickly, as in situations of time pressure or danger. When this is not the 
case, however, a high need for cognitive closure will re ult in dogmatism. 
Need for Cognition Cacioppo and Petty (1982) found that people vary in 
their enjoy1nent of thinking; their need for cognition. Whereas subjects with 
a high need for cognition found a sin1ple task unpleasant and a complex task 
pleasant, subjects with a low need for cognition reported the reverse. Need 
for cognition correlated negatively with dogmatism (r = -.27, N = 104, p < 
.05), indicating that an open mind is one with a preference for activity. An 
individual high in the need for cognition would tend to be the opposite of the 
certainty-oriented individual, with a desire to search for more information, 
even when it challenges his or her pre ent beliefs. 
We would hope that the intellectually gifted child has this preference for 
cognition, particularly if that preference has been nurtured from an early age. 
Need for cognition has been found to correlate with measures of fluid intel-
ligence in an older sample (Stuart-Hamilton & McDonald, 2001). In a review 
of the literature on need for cognition, Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, Blair, and 
Jarvis (1996) reported that a relationship between such factors a verbal ability 
and school achieven1ent covary with need for cognition, but there is no evi-
dence that abstract reasoning shares this relationship. Different types of intel-
lectual ability may be associated with different thinking dispositions. 
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There is a parallel in the gifted literature to the need for cognition. Dab-
rowski's (1966) Theory of Positive Disintegration is often proposed as providing 
the architecture for advanced development. The theory emphasizes intensity, 
sensitivity, and overexcitability as characteristic of the highly gifted. It is based 
on the premise that advanced development is possible as people strive toward 
what ought to be rather than focusing on what is. Overexcitabilities are inborn 
tendencies to respond to environment stimuli. For example, intellectual over-
excitabilities are often considered characteristic of the gifted personality and 
described as a need to seek understanding, the truth, and to analyze and syn-
thesize information (Dabrowski & Piechowski, 1977). However, Dabrowski's 
theory claims that one of the types of the five overexcitabilities (sensorimotor, 
sensual, imaginational, intellectual, emotional) would often exist in the highly 
gifted personality, not necessarily that intellectual overexcitabilities would 
exist. Some have argued that all five categories of overexcitabilities would exist 
in the highly gifted. The research on this theory, while growing, is quite lim-
ited and mixed, but it does provide a link between the field of gifted studies 
and cognitive psychology. 
Personal Epistemology 
The cognitive orientations described have been studied largely separately from 
research in personal epistemology. Thi~ field has not yet produced a clearly 
articulated model explaining a person's beliefs about knowledge and knowing 
(Greene, Torney-Purta, & Azevedo, 2010; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997), although 
interest in personal epistemology research has been steady. One branch of 
investigation in this area has generated a description of the development of 
epistemological understanding that may be useful to us in our examination of 
motivated dogmatism. 
Perry (1970) and Kitchener and King (1990), in their early work on personal 
epistemology, found that college students developed their knowledge about 
knowing in stages, from a view of knowledge as absolute and handed down 
from an authority, to uncertainty, and then a more mature position of the 
subjectivity of knowledge. Schommer (1994) describes beliefs about knowl-
edge and knowing as centered on "the source, certainty, and organization of 
knowledge, as well as the speed and control of knowledge acquisition" (p. 302). 
These beliefs are significantly related to myriad aspects of learning. For exam-
ple, learners who believe that knowledge is fed to a passive recipient from an 
authority are less engaged in the learning process (Schommer, 1994). Students 
who believed that learning should be quick were less persistent in a difficult 
learning task than those who believed learning is a gradual process. Dweck 
and Leggett (1988) found that beliefs about ability, intelligence in particular, as 
either a fixed entity or as incremental and, thus, improvable, affect motivation 
to achieve. Epistemological beliefs have implications for adequate processing of 
information in decision making. 
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In her study of informal reasoning, Kuhn (1991) interviewed 160 subjects 
of varying ages, genders, and education levels about their beliefs concerning 
three topics: a student struggling in school, a criminal repeatedly ending up in 
prison, and unemployment. Subjects were asked to give their opinions concern-
ing the scenario described and then queried about why they believe so, how 
they might be convinced otherwise, and how they might convince someone 
with a divergent opinion that they were right. Even with very little informa-
tion to go on, more than half of the subjects believed very strongly they knew 
the cause of the problem. Some of these subjects admitted they did not have 
n1uch knowledge of the topic , but maintained their level of certainty regard-
less. These subjects fell into the absolutist category and held very strongly to the 
opinion that they could not be swayed from that belief, even w hen they agreed 
another person might be right: " ... personal commitment to [their] theory is 
sufficient to ensure its certainty" (p. 175). The large numbers of absolutists in 
Kuhn's study would be considered dogmatic. They hold unwarranted beliefs 
acquired through an insufficient examination of evidence. 
About a third of Kuhn's subjects fell into the multiplist epistemological cat-
egory. These subjects believed strongly that anyone's opinion could be right. 
The n1ultiplist may be just a right as an expert or more so, particularly when 
his or her belief is based on personal experience, as in the school scenario . The 
multiplists base their beliefs on an "ownership" of the opinion. The multiplist 
has insufficiently examined the evidence persons with opposing views have 
used to reach a decision and has seized on her or his own opinion. Dogmatic 
in their own views, multiplists may not be perceived as such because of their 
willingness to accept differing viewpoints. The end result, however, is a belief 
achieved with insufficient evidence. 
The remaining 20% of the subjects in Kuhn's (1991) study were categorized 
as evaluative epistemologists. This minority believed that n1ultiple viewpoints may 
exist and that they can be compared to each other and evaluated to determine 
how valid or accurate they might be. These subjects did not maintain a high 
level of certainty in their beliefs and felt that they could be swayed by the argu-
ments of others , especially experts, if sufficient evidence wa provided. 
Following up on this classification of thinkers , Kuhn (2003) has utilized the 
research on personal epistemology (see Hofer & Pintrich, 1997, for a review) to 
describe these categories as developmental, adding a preschool age of realist, in 
which children consider what they know to be just what they see. Table 10.1 
describes these levels of epistemological understanding. 
To an evaluative epistemologist, it is clear that the development of an evalu-
ative orientation should be the objective of any schooling. A nation made up of 
multiplists and absolutists will be easily manipulated or, at best, poor decision 
makers. At this time, we know little about the developmental progression of 
personal epistemology. Most research on its development has been with college 
samples (Kitchener, King, Wood, & Davison, 1989; Schommer, 1994). From 
what we do know about gifted children, it is likely that many of them could 
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TABLE 10.1 Levels of Epistemological Understanding 
Level Assertions Knowledge Critical Thinking 
Realist Assertions are COPIES Knowledge comes Critical thinking is 
of an external reality. from an external unnecessary. 
source and is certain. 
Absolutist Assertions are FACTS Knowledge comes Critical thinking is a 
that are correct or from an external vehicle for 
incorrect in their source and is certain comparing 
representation of but not directly assertions to reality 
reality. accessible, producing and determining 
false beliefs. their truth or 
falsehood. 
Multiplist Assertions are Knowledge is Critical thinking is 
OPINIONS freely generated by human irrelevant. 
chosen by and minds and therefore 
accountable only to uncertain. 
their owners. 
Evaluativist Assertions are Knowledge is Critical thinking is 
JUDGMENTS that can generated by human valued as a vehicle 
be evaluated and minds and is that promotes sound 
compared according to uncertain but assertions and 
criteria of argument susceptible to enhances 
and evidence. evaluation. understanding. 
Reprinted with permission from Kuhn, D. (2003). Understanding and valuing knowing as developmental goals. 
Liberal Education, 89(3), 16-21. 
attain higher levels of epistemological development at an early age. Could we 
expect a gifted absolutist? Multiplist? Almost certainly. 
Thinking Dispositions and High Ability 
Values, attitudes, cognitive orientations, personal epistemologies-the highly 
able student possesses all of these. Despite their exceptional cognitive ability, a 
thinking disposition that does not include an open rn.ind is limiting. A number 
of researchers have found that cognitive ability does not predict the ability 
to reason carefully. Klaczynski (1997) found that high intellectual ability did 
not protect adolescents from biased reasoning. Subjects preferred to look for 
information consistent with their own prior beliefs regardless of their intellec-
tual ability. These findings have been repeatedly corroborated (Klaczynski & 
Gordon, 1996; Klaczynski et al., 1997): cognitive ability does not equate with 
reasoning ability or the use of heuristics in evaluating information. The gifted 
child may well be an absolutist. Even a high need for cognition was not suffi-
cient to predict unbiased critical reasoning (Klaczynski et al., 1997). Stanovich 
and West (1997) found that the ability to evaluate an argument independently 
of prior belief was more reliant on one's open-mindedness than on one's cogni-
tive ability. 
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Although all these studies of critical thinking (Klaczynski, 1997; Klaczynski 
et al., 1997; Stanovich & West, 1997) found ways in which ability was associ-
ated with the quality of reasoning, biases and thinking dispositions were unre-
lated to cognitive ability. In contrast to these results, Sa, West, and Stanovich 
(1999) did find a relationship between cognitive ability and the ability to ignore 
prior knowledge and belief when engaging in a reasoning task. The difference 
in this study and others is that Sa and colleagues explicitly told their subjects to 
ignore their prior knowledge or belief. When given these instructions, those 
with greater cognitive ability were better able to engage in thoughtful reason-
ing than their less-able peers. This is a very positive finding for those who wish 
to encourage more open-mindedness among high-ability tudents. They can 
be open-n1inded if they are taught to be. 
Developing Evaluative Epistemologists Among the Highly Able 
A study of the highly able, by whatever definition is chosen, is a study of indi-
vidual differences. The sample is selected based on their fit with the selected 
criteria. The constructs described here are all imilarly designed to find indi-
vidual differences in ways of thinking-those who are more or less tolerant of 
ambiguity, closed-minded, certainty-oriented, and so forth. From the critical 
thinking research cited (Klaczynski, 1997; Klaczynski et al., 1997; Stanovich & 
West, 1997), it is evident that these variations in cognitive ability and di posi-
tions exist in many combinations. The motivation to be open-minded may be 
weak when one has been encouraged through influence or experience to prefer 
predictability and heuristics for reasoning. How can educators encourage the 
opposite? Are there ways of nurturing an open mind? 
We propose that it is possible to encourage open-mindedness among the 
highly able . Dogmatism is, again, defined as "1) positiveness in assertion of 
opinion ... [and] 2) a viewpoint or system of ideas based on insufficiently exam-
ined premises" (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 2010). First and foremost, 
educators must teach their students how to sufficiently examine any premise. 
With these skills, it will be difficult for students to be positive in their assertions 
until they have fully explored the problem. 
Those of us in higher education have come to know that the more we learn, 
the more there is to learn. Our own open-mindedness has developed through 
learning how to pose a research question and examine it systematically. Science 
and mathematics education focus on these methods, but all subjects should 
emphasize the methods needed for sufficiently exploring a premise. Halpern 
(1998) proposes the following critical-thinking skills as necessary for develop-
ing effective thinkers: (a) verbal reasoning skills, (b) argument analysis skills, 
(c) skills in thinking as hypothesis testing, (d) likelihood and uncertainty, and 
(e) decision-making and problem-solving skills . These skills should be founda-
tional in learning about any content area. 
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Many of the motivating epistemic orientations described here have been 
proposed as protective: Budner's (1962) intolerance of ambiguity protects 
against the threat of complex situations; Rokeach's (1960) closed-mindedness 
protects one from the confusion of the outside world; Sorrentino and Short's 
(1986) certainty orientation protects the clarity one has achieved in a situation. 
These protections will not be necessary once a student has successfully learned 
how to analyze a situation. Developing critical thinking skills (Klaczynski, 
1997; Klaczynski & Gordon, 1996) and learning how to evaluate an argument 
(Kuhn & Dean, 2005; Kuhn & Udell, 2003) will provide protection from the 
anxiety produced by complex situations; students will know how to decon-
struct and analyze them. 
Learning about one's own "personal theories" of knowledge (Hofer & 
Pintrich, 1997) is useful for challenging immature epistemological beliefs. For 
example, the notion of an "omniscient authority" (Schommer, 1990, 1994) 
and that hands down information must be dispelled if we wish to encourage 
a complete examination of a premise. The current focus on accountability in 
education fosters such immature beliefs in students, who must learn "the facts" 
to be successful on high-stakes tests. Educators and students alike can benefit 
from an understanding of their own beliefs about knowledge. 
Parents and past experience will have played a substantial role in the devel-
opment of open-mindedness before a student arrives in the classroom. Some 
students will arrive with a great willingness to explore, while others will be 
more inhibited, held back by fears of rejection or embarrassment. Educators 
should consider their students' values of self-enhancement or transcendence 
and openness to change or conservatism. Forcing a child who values conser-
vatism to step outside the boundaries of tradition and conformity is likely to 
result in discomfort unless done with sensitivity. Educators should provide a 
supportive classroom, one where questioning is valued over answers, where 
exploration is encouraged and reyvarded, where the "facts" take a back seat to 
the methods used to obtain them. 
To be most effective in promoting open-mindedness, educators must pro-
vide a role model to their students. Modeling a high need for cognition, a 
tolerance for ambiguity, an uncertainty orientation, a low need for cogni-
tive closure (except when appropriate), and an open mind will go a long way 
towards reducing dogmatism in their students. 
Our goal as educators should be to produce evaluative epistemologists. One 
must be open-minded to carefully evaluate information, as Stanovich and 
West's (1997) research demonstrated. This open-mindedness should extend to 
the dogmatic you encounter. Are you sufficiently examining the evidence of 
their argument? Or are you relying on your own beliefs to reach that conclu-
sion? Close examination of values may identify the source of differences of 
opinion. It is important to remember that dogmatism is a way of approaching 
information. The content of a belief system is not the source of dogn1atism, 
regardless of how much one disagrees. 
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Although dogmatism has been measured as a stable trait (Rokeach, 1960), 
there is evidence that dogrn.atic behaviors are, instead, affected by situations 
(Kruglanski, 1989) and are motivated (e.g., Cacioppo et al., 19_96; Jost et al, 
2003) by the satisfaction of basic needs, including safety and cognitive needs 
(Maslow, 1970), and by individual values. An analysis of the thinking disposi-
tions and personal epistemology literature suggests a path for educators who 
wish to encourage the developn1ent of evaluative epistemology. Providing 
them with the tools of evaluation will be the greatest protection educators can 
give the high-ability student. They require more than a hammer to deal with 
the complex world around us. 
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